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To many, the principal-agent model is the obvious lens through which executive pay should 
be viewed.  Such a sentiment sits uncomfortably with a large number of empirical studies 
suggesting that the process of determining executive pay seems to be more readily explained 
by recourse to arguments of managerial power and influence.  This paper investigates the 
micro-underpinnings of boardroom behavior in order to explain this departure from principal-
agency theory’s argument that executive compensation serves to align interests between the 
owners of the company and its senior managers. We find that there are strong interaction 
effects among social influence variables and the social setting of boardroom activity. 
Generous pay awards, bearing only a weak connection to corporate performance, are 
explained in the context of the social psychology of the boardroom. These results, and a 
review of the empirical research, suggest the need for a more comprehensive model of 
executive compensation that incorporates both economic and psychological determinants.   
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     In the past decade, CEO compensation has attracted the attention of economists, 
accountants, finance professors, lawyers, organizational researchers, regulators, governance 
experts, consultants, journalists, and the general public. Annual issues of business magazines 
and newspapers are devoted to the topic. Academic journals sponsor special issues on the 
subject. Yet, in spite of this widespread interest and voluminous research, there is a general 
pessimism about our understanding of the topic. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) note that over the 
past decade the increase in papers on executive compensation may have exceeded even the 
remarkable increases in executive compensation itself. 
The dominant theoretical perspective for the majority of studies of executive 
compensation has been principal-agent theory (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In his review of the field, Murphy noted that “Most research on 
executive compensation has been firmly (if not always explicitly) rooted in agency 
theory: compensation plans are designed to align the interests of risk averse, self-
interested executives with those of shareholders (Murphy, 1999: 38).” Unfortunately, the 
results of all this scholarly effort are not reassuring. A topic of both practical and academic 
interest has spawned a significant body of both theoretical and empirical research with 
modest results and little practical application. Even the staunchest of its supporters 
acknowledge that the results are under-whelming: “In spite of the fact that principal agent 
models yield few insights useful in understanding the structure and design of actual contracts, 
agency theory remains a powerful paradigm for both analyzing and designing executive 
compensation contracts (Murphy, 1999: 5).”   
 For instance, in a meta-analytic review of more than 150 studies of governance and 
executive compensation, the authors concluded, “We are not optimistic that further research 
in the general area of board compensation/financial performance and board leadership 
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structure/financial performance would be fruitful (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 
1998).” In another meta-analytic review with 69 samples and more than 30,000 observations, 
Deutsch (2005: 424) concluded that “The results provide little support to agency theory’s 
predictions on the impact of board composition on critical decisions that involve a potential 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.” In their summary to a special issue 
of the Academy of Management Journal dedicated to executive compensation and firm 
performance, Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998: 143) concluded that: “Adding more 
empirical studies on the statistical relationship between executive pay and firm performance 
to the vast literature that already exists on this issue leads researchers into a blind alley.”  
In light of this lack of definitive support for an agency perspective, a number of 
authors have proposed that rather than the board serving the shareholders’ interests it may be 
that boards can be “captured” by the CEO and made to serve his or her interests and that, 
“The pervasive role of managerial power has played a key role in shaping managers’ pay 
arrangements” (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004: 2).” Although this alternative view has provided 
some convincing illustrations for how the executive compensation wage setting process may 
reflect managerial influence, it typically does this without documenting how this influence 
process works. What is lacking is a better understanding of the “mechanisms of action” by 
which these effects occur.  
In this paper we seek to understand how boards and compensation committees 
determine CEO compensation. We draw on research in social psychology to offer a more 
psychologically-based interpretation of the mechanism of action that underlies how boards of 
directors may operate. We use these insights to enrich both principal-agent theory and 
managerial influence perspectives on CEO compensation. We agree with Murphy (1999) that 
principal-agent theory remains a useful lens through which to view governance and incentive 
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alignment, but add to this more detail on the social dynamics that characterize the functioning 
of boards of directors.  
Consistent with much prior research, our empirical results show that while principal 
agent predictions of executive compensation are statistically significant, they explain little 
important variance. Further, and also consistent with recent research, conventional measures 
of “good governance” add very little to the explained variance in executive compensation 
and, as noted by Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2004: 4), “the signs of the estimated 
coefficients are frequently unexpected.” Finally, we show how two fundamental mechanisms 
of action, social influence and reciprocity, affect the dynamics of CEO-board interactions and 
the executive wage setting process. These effects explain significant increments in variance 
in CEO pay beyond that accounted for by economic and governance determinants.  
In section I we briefly review the voluminous research on executive compensation 
from a principal-agent perspective. We summarize the findings that are consistent with 
agency theory and note areas of inconsistency. In section II we show how principal agent 
thinking has been reflected in notions of good corporate governance and consider how these 
practical implications have affected CEO pay. In section III we review the primary 
alternative theory to agency theory, the management power or influence approach, and 
illustrate how this approach expands our understanding of the functioning of the board of 
directors. In section IV, drawing upon a long tradition of research in social psychology, we 
propose that two fundamental psychological processes underlie much of this research and 
offer hypotheses for how these may affect board dynamics and CEO compensation decisions. 
Section V describes our data and results for tests of principal-agent theory, good governance, 
managerial influence and the psychological determinants of CEO compensation. Section VI 
discusses the implications of these for future theory building and research on executive 
compensation and corporate governance.   
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I. Principal Agent Theory and CEO Compensation: What Do We Know? 
It is not our intent to review principal agent theory here; the theory is well known to 
readers (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and a number of 
comprehensive treatments are available (Garen, 1994; Jensen & Murphy, 2004; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). In brief, principal agent theory recognizes the fundamental problem created 
by the separation of ownership and control in which managers, whose interests in being paid 
more and working less, may diverge from that of the shareholders desire for maximization of 
the value of their equity investments. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 738) characterize principal 
agent theory pungently as answering the following question: “We want to know how 
investors get the managers to give them back their money.”  
In this scheme, the power to run the company is vested in the board of directors under 
whose direction the affairs of the corporation are to be managed. In agency theory, the board 
is assumed to craft an optimal pay mechanism to align the interests of the CEO and those of 
the shareholders. In Jensen and Murphy’s terms, “Agency theory predicts that an optimal 
contract will tie the agent’s expected utility to the principal’s wealth; therefore agency theory 
predicts that CEO compensation policies will depend on changes in shareholder wealth 
(1990: 242).” The strong presumption is that directors are to make decisions to serve the 
shareholders’ interests. In this view, efficient compensation contracts should link executive 
pay with performance and thereby reduce the agency costs associated with the misaligned 
interests between owners and managers. The board’s role in representing the shareholders’ 
interest is to cost-effectively align managers’ incentives. Any loss of board independence, 
such as managerial influence over board decisions, is seen as an agency problem.   
The agency theory literature emphasizes the ex ante bargaining over compensation 
that is presumed to occur between the board of directors and the CEO. In this view, the board 
assumes a crucial role in both designing a contract that aligns the interests of the shareholders 
 7
and management and monitoring and enforcing the terms of the contract. In this story, the 
board is always assumed to represent the principals’ interests and never to be captured by 
management. Directors are assumed to be kept vigilant out of concern for their own 
reputations (Yermack, 2004) or fear of legal sanction (Holmstom and Kaplan, 2004: 21). 
Thus, two central testable propositions arising from agency theory concern the design of 
optimal compensation contracts and the monitoring function of the board (e.g., Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2001; Yermack, 1997).  
The Empirical Evidence . 
Much empirical evidence has accumulated in support of a number of agency theory 
predictions. For instance, studies have shown that increased board control is associated with 
lower CEO compensation packages (e.g., Agarwal & Knoeber, 1996; Boyd, 1994; Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999; Gompers, Ishii & 
Metrick, 2003; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994), while increased outside ownership is associated 
with better firm performance (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein, 1994; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2001; Core, et al., 1999; Cyert, Kang & Kumar, 2002; Goldberg & Idson, 1995; He & 
Conyon, 2003; Werner, Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 2005). Further, executive compensation has 
been linked to variability in CEO effort and market variability (Abowd, 1990; Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 2003; Bryan, Hwang & Lilien, 2000; Garen, 1994; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Kaplan, 
2008; Leonard, 1990; Mengistae & Xu, 2004; Mishra, McConaughy & Gobeli, 2000). 
Hartzell and Starks (2002) find that increased institutional ownership concentration is also 
associated with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity and is negatively related to CEO pay. 
Klein (2002) reported that independent boards are also less likely to manage earnings.  
Other research has demonstrated that when boards are less independent, indexed by 
the CEO also holding the title of chairman of the board, CEO compensation is higher (e.g., 
Boyd, 1995; Core, et al., 1999; Cyert, et al., 2002; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Rechner & 
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Dalton, 1991). Goyal and Park (2002), for example, found that when there was CEO duality 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance was lower than when the two roles were split. 
Other research has found that the market value of firms is higher when the roles are split 
(Brown & Caylor, 2004; Yermack, 1996). In this vein, Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino 
(1997) find that boards that are less independent, as indexed by anti-takeover provisions, pay 
CEOs more.  
While impressive on the face of it, there are an equally large number of studies that 
either find no effects for agency theory predictions, or find effects that run counter to the 
theory (e.g., Fligstein & Choo, 2004; Kerr & Bettis, 1987; Sanders, Davis-Blake & 
Frederickson, 1995). For example, in a meta-analysis of board composition using 159 
samples (N=40,160) and board leadership (54 samples, N=12,915), Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand 
and Johnson (1998: 278) find no support for agency theory and conclude that “The evidence 
suggests, then, that board composition has virtually no effect on firm performance.” In 
another meta-analytic review, Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia (2000) identified 137 
studies that analyzed CEO compensation and firm performance and concluded that “Changes 
in firm performance account for only four percent of the variance in CEO pay,” an amount 
less than what agency theory would suggest, although it has been argued that with a sufficient 
sensitivity to pay variation even modest levels of pay for performance can produce an 
incentive effect (Garen 1994; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Haubrich, 1994).  
Other studies have found not only no link between independent directors and 
executive compensation (Anderson & Bizjak, 2002; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand & Dalton, 
1998; Newman & Mozes, 1999), but some evidence that more inside directors may provide 
value-enhancing information (Klein, 1998). Other studies fail to find that CEO duality has 
the negative effects on compensation and performance predicted by agency theory (Baglia, 
Moyer & Rao, 1996; Boyd, 1995; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Rechner & Dalton, 1989) while 
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others find that boards with more serving CEOs as directors have lower levels of CEO pay 
(Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Callahan, Millar and Schulman (2003) 
find that increased CEO involvement on the board is associated with increased corporate 
performance. Westphal (1999) showed that CEO-Board social ties, rather than subverting the 
independence of the board, can have positive effects by increasing the frequency of advice 
and counsel between board members and the CEO.  
Thus, the evidence for the usefulness of agency theory as a way of characterizing 
CEO-board relationships is mixed at best. Advocates can point to individual studies 
confirming agency theory predictions (e.g., Abowd & Kaplan, 1999; Devers, Cannella, Reilly 
& Yoder, 2007; Murphy, 2002; Vafeas, 1999) while critics can point to studies that either fail 
to confirm predictions or provide contradictory evidence (e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). This 
ambivalence is reflected in Kevin Murphy’s (1999: 5) acknowledgement that, on the one 
hand, that “principal agent models yield few insights useful in understanding the structure 
and design of actual contracts” while on the other hand that “agency theory remains a 
powerful paradigm for both analyzing and designing compensation contracts.” Thus, 
principal agent theory is well-supported by the empirical evidence, but the results are 
typically neither strong nor always consistent.  
II. Board Governance 
One manifestation of Murphy’s argument can be seen in the influence of principal 
agent theory on practical attempts to improve corporate governance by regulatory agencies 
and shareholder groups. The high-profile failures of firms such as Adelphia, Enron, Tyco and 
WorldCom were attributed to a failure in corporate governance and led directly to the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, considered to be the most sweeping corporate 
governance regulation change in the past 70 years. Underlying this change was the 
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expectation that better governed firms should perform better than those that are worse 
governed (Bender & Moir, 2005).  
Although not spelled out in detail, many of the assumptions made in the attempt to 
improve governance come directly from agency theory and are intended to reduce the 
“control rights” of managers (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Brown & Caylor, 2004; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). In this view, corporate governance refers to the set of mechanisms that 
influence decisions made by managers when there is a separation of ownership and control 
(Larcker, et al, 2004). Among the suggestions for good governance included in Sarbanes-
Oxley and guidelines adopted by groups like the Council of Institutional Investors and the 
National Association of Corporate Directors are strictures on insiders serving on board 
committees, the promotion of boards with more independence from CEO influence, the 
reduction in mechanisms that may protect CEOs from external influence (like staggered 
boards), increased board diversity, and more monitoring of corporate decisions. Consistent 
with agency theory, the primary intent of these recommendations is to promote more 
independence of the board and to increase transparency of board decision making.  
For example, many of the guidelines emphasize the importance of increased board 
independence. The straightforward argument is that firms with stronger shareholder rights 
will be better governed and, therefore, perform better (e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, 2004; Brown 
& Caylor, 2004; Gompers, et al., 2003). Thus, guidelines encourage the appointment of more 
non-executive directors, especially on the audit and compensation committees. Similarly, the 
presence of a staggered board where a limited number of directors are elected at one time is 
seen as a mechanism of management entrenchment that cannot be easily dismantled by a 
hostile bidder and is not considered good governance. Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian 
(2002) examined the effects of staggered boards and found that having one doubles the odds 
of a takeover target remaining independent which, in turn, leaves the shareholders worse off 
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than if the firm had been acquired by a white knight. Unfortunately, as with much of the 
empirical literature, there is also countervailing evidence indicating that firms with staggered 
boards had higher net profit margins and higher dividend yields (Brown & Caylor, 2004). 
Another suggestion made for better corporate governance is for increased diversity on 
the board (Catalyst, 2004; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Westphal & 
Milton, 2000), and there is some evidence of a significant increase in women serving on 
corporate boards over the past decade (Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999; Farrell & Hersch, 2005). 
The argument for more women is based on the larger talent pool, the power of women as 
consumers, and the infusion of new ideas that these directors can bring (Useem, 1993). But 
the evidence for having more women on the board is mixed (Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 
2002; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003; Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  
Unfortunately, the evidence for the efficacy of good governance in promoting firm 
performance is decidedly mixed. Nelson (2005), in a cross-national study of regulatory 
changes in corporate governance, found no relationships between CEO tenure or 
compensation and changes in governance. And, while Anderson and Bizjak (2003) did find 
that after changes in the regulations, the percentage of outsiders on compensation committees 
increased from 59 percent to 75 percent, they also found no evidence that insiders on the 
compensation committee acted opportunistically, a finding also confirmed by others (e.g., 
Conyon & Peck, 1998; Daily, et al., 1998; Newman & Mozes, 1999). In reviewing the 
evidence for the impact of governance changes on firm performance, Larcker, Richardson 
and Tuna (2004: 38) examined 38 structural measures of corporate governance in a sample of 
2,126 firms and noted both the lack of corroborating evidence supporting the idea that better 
governance matters:  “Assumptions and strongly held beliefs about the importance of 
governance are shaping the current regulatory climate for the design of governance 
structures.” They concluded that “our corporate governance constructs have limited 
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explanatory power for explaining managerial choices or firm valuation…(2004: 4).” Thus, in 
spite of the reasonable claim that increased board monitoring and incentive alignment will 
benefit shareholders, the practical application of these recommendations appears to be largely 
ineffectual.  
III. Management Influence 
In light of the lack of definitive support for an agency perspective, a number of 
authors have proposed that rather than the board serving the shareholders’ interests it may be 
that boards can be “captured” by the CEO and made to serve his or her interests (e.g., 
Bertrand & Mullianathan, 2001; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Lambert, Larcker & Weigelt, 
1993; Wade, O’Reilly & Chandratat, 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1995); that is, CEOs may be 
able to influence the remuneration decisions made by the board or the compensation 
committee. Recently, Bebchuk and Fried (2004: 2) have summarized this literature and 
concluded that “The pervasive role of managerial power has played a key role in shaping 
managers’ pay arrangements.” In this view, the design of executive compensation is seen as a 
part of the agency problem itself, in that managers may have an interest in reducing pay-for-
performance sensitivity and some of the risks associated with this. Noting that compensation 
arrangements often deviated from the optimal contracting proposed by principal agent theory, 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) observed that “financial economists have often labored to come up 
with clever explanations for how such practices might be considered arm’s-length contracting 
after all (p. 3).” 
Like agency theory, the premise underlying “managerialism” began with Berle and 
Means almost 70 years ago and their observation that “The separation of ownership from 
control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of the ultimate manager may, 
and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use 
of power disappear (1932: 25).” A number of researchers have applied this logic to CEO 
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compensation and argued that, unencumbered by external constraints, executives may extract 
rents from the owners (shareholders) because of informational asymmetries and misaligned 
goals (e.g., Allen, 1981; Fama & Jensen, 1983; O’Reilly, Main & Crystal, 1988). From the 
managerialist influence perspective, the prediction is that executives who have more power 
vis-à-vis their boards should receive higher pay and should be less sensitive to performance. 
Murphy (2002: 3) acknowledged that Bebchuk and Fried presented “a compelling case that 
optimal contracting concerns do not explain the level and structure of executive 
compensation in U.S. corporations.”  
The straightforward prediction from an influence perspective is that CEO pay will be 
higher and pay-for-performance sensitivity lower in firms where CEOs have more power. 
This condition may exist when, for example, directors who have been appointed by a 
standing CEO feel a sense of obligation to repay the favor, when the CEO serves as the 
chairman, or the board is protected by anti-takeover agreements. The empirical research in 
this tradition is largely consistent with this prediction and has shown that a variety of political 
and institutional factors, beyond economic determinants, are related to executive 
compensation, including the CEO’s ability to appoint or co-opt supposedly independent 
directors and control the board’s agenda and information flow (Belliveau, O’Reilly & Wade, 
1996; Combs, Ketchen, Perryman & Donahue, 2007; Core, et al., 1999; Hallock, 1997; 
Lambert, et al., 1993; Main, O’Reilly & Wade, 1993; Shen, Gentry & Tosi, 2004;). Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) noted that, from an agency theory perspective, just as managers cannot be 
automatically presumed to seek to maximize shareholder value neither can directors. Just as a 
CEO may have his or her self-interest in mind, so too do directors who, aside from the 
significant fees and status derived from their service on the board, also typically have only 
nominal equity interests in the firm (Core, et al., 1999; Yermack, 2004).   
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In their comprehensive review of the managerial power perspective, Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003, 2004) made clear that this alternative is not proposed as a replacement for 
principal agent theory but simply that compensation practices cannot be explained by optimal 
contracting alone. There is ample evidence that multiple models are operating, including 
agency theory, managerial power, repeated games, and tournament models (e.g., Baker, 
Gibbons & Murphy, 2002; Core, et al., 1999; Gibbons, 1998; Lambert, et al., 1993; O’Reilly, 
et al., 1988; Shen et al., 2004; Stevenson & Radin, 2009). What is called for is a more 
nuanced understanding of the underlying psychological processes that characterize board 
dynamics and the executive compensation process.  
For example, a strong assumption of an agency view of governance is that the board’s 
role is to act as a monitor and evaluator of CEO performance, not as an ally or advisor. 
However, this may be an overly restrictive view of the board’s role. The CEO’s job is 
inherently ambiguous and uncertain (March, 1984). As such, if boards are also to help the 
CEO as a source of expert advice, the rigid solution suggested by arm’s-length optimal 
contracting may reduce agency costs but hinder the ability of the board to provide counsel 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). In a study using survey data from 
243 CEOs and 564 outside directors, Westphal (1998) found that board-CEO social 
interactions were positively related to firm performance. Agarwal and Knoeber (2001) found 
that outside directors can serve a valuable political role in helping firms adapt to regulatory 
changes. For these positive interactions to occur, the CEO-board relationship needs to be 
more than arm’s-length and directors themselves may need a sense of psychological 
ownership and identification with the firm (Wade, Porac & Pollock, 1997). Firstenberg and 
Malkiel (1994: 29) argue for this potential: “The board’s shared experience with management 
in working through problems…builds an innate loyalty.”  
 15
Thus, while board members have a fiduciary obligation to the shareholders, they also 
have a strong, tacit obligation to “help” the CEO make the firm successful. The latter is more 
proximal than the former. In this way, while managerial influence may impose costs by 
violating the independence valued by agency theory, it may also offer benefits for 
shareholders if the board is able to help the firm be more successful. Further, rather than 
observing contingent CEO contracts based on verifiable measures as proposed by agency 
theory, we more often observe highly incomplete contracts without explicit incentives. 
Indeed, Fehr and Gaechter (2000) showed experimentally that such implicit contracts are far 
more preferred that explicit ones. What this suggests is the need for a more sophisticated 
understanding of the psychological dynamics that underpin CEO-board dynamics; a more 
process perspective that opens up the normative “black box” that existing theories, both 
agency and managerial influence, currently contain (e.g., Davis & Greve, 1997; Main, et al., 
1995; Stevenson & Radin, 2009; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Drawing on research in social 
psychology, the next section posits two pervasive underlying psychological processes that 
shape CEO-board interactions in ways that can affect CEO compensation.  
IV. A Psychological Perspective on CEO Compensation 
A psychological approach to executive compensation begins with the premise that the 
compensation-setting process in firms relies on the deliberations of a small group of 
responsible individuals (e.g., the board and the compensation committee) and, as such, this 
process is subject to the same social psychological processes that affect group decision 
making everywhere. This is especially true when making ambiguous decisions, such as 
setting CEO compensation, where the use of social information is highlighted (March, 1984). 
In this context, social capital can provide important cues–such as the credibility and 
attractiveness of a source–that people may use in place of hard facts when the judgment task 
is ambiguous (Belliveau et al., 1996; O’Reilly, et al., 1988). These conditions enhance the 
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operation of two fundamental social psychological processes: reciprocity and social 
influence. We describe how these processes operate and their likely effects on CEO wage 
setting by the board and the compensation committee. 
A. Reciprocity  
 Reciprocity is a fundamental norm in all societies and pervasive in economic as well 
as social life (e.g., Cialdini, 1993; Elster, 1989). Norms are social expectations about how 
people ought to behave in a given social context. These shared expectations provide both 
information (how we should behave) and sanctions (what happens if one does or doesn’t 
conform). As a norm, reciprocity dictates that “when one party benefits another, an obligation 
is generated (Gouldner, 1960: 174).” The expectation that another group member will feel 
obligated when helped can trigger a host of beneficial continuing exchanges. The failure to 
reciprocate may engender sanctions (e.g., Fehr & Gaechter, 2000; Sethi & Somanathan, 
2003). Reciprocity is so pervasive and fundamental to human interaction that it forms the 
basis for a number of psychological theories such as social exchange (Blau, 1994) and 
fairness and equity (Adams, 1963). Some have argued that it has evolutionary advantages 
(Ridley, 1997).  
 As an example of reciprocity, Whately, Webster, Smith and Rhodes (1999) 
demonstrated that when subjects in an experiment were given a small unexpected favor (a 
soft drink), they were subsequently more likely to comply with a request—even when they 
believed that the giver would not know if they had reciprocated. Kunz and Woolcott (1976) 
sent Christmas cards to a list of strangers and received a large number of responses. There is 
convincing evidence that servers can increase tips through reciprocity (Rind & Strohmetz, 
2001; Tidd & Lochard, 1978). There is similar evidence from studies of reciprocity in work 
settings (e.g., Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003). For example, Dabos and Rousseau (2004) found 
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that reciprocity in the employment relationship was positively related to subsequent 
performance and negatively associated with turnover.  
 In spite of the long-standing tradition in economics that characterizes people as  
solely self-interested, there is a growing literature on the importance of reciprocity (e.g.,  
Akerlof & Yellen, 1990; Fehr & Gaechter, 2000; Rabin, 1993). In a recent review, Sethi and  
Somanathan (2003, p.1) claimed that “Reciprocity is a pervasive and economically  
significant phenomenon in human interaction.” While cooperation occurs because of  
expected future material benefits, reciprocity occurs when an individual is responding to  
actions even if no material gain is anticipated. Evidence from repeated game experiments  
and gift exchange suggests that people are willing to incur material costs to either sanction  
those who are perceived of as opportunistic or reward others for their generosity (e.g., Berg,  
Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995; Fehr & Gaechter, 2000; Gibbons, 1998). Many people deviate  
from self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner. For example, in a laboratory  
experiment, Fehr, Gaechter and Kirchsteiger (1997) demonstrated that in the face of  
generosity by the employer, workers expended far more effort than required or expected by  
classical economic assumptions of shirking. Field studies corroborate these findings (Bewley,  
1995). In another set of experiments, Fehr and his colleagues (Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold &  
Gaechter, 1998) studied the effects of reciprocity on wage setting and demonstrated that,  
consistent with Akerlof’s (1982) notion of employment as gift exchange, reciprocity gives  
rise to wages that are persistently above the competitive level.  
 In the context of corporate governance, there are clearly material benefits, both  
financial and status-related, from serving on a board. Insofar as the CEO is seen as at least  
partly responsible for aspects of their appointment, for example by serving on the nominating  
committee or paying generous fees, a board member can expect to feel some reciprocal  
obligation (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1998). Further, reciprocity is found to be  
 18
more likely to occur when transaction costs are high, the group continues to interact over  
time, the period between interactions is relatively short, and the group itself is small and  
homogeneous (Borcherding & Filson, 2002), all characteristics that describe boards of  
directors. This may account for Crystal’s observation that (1991: 40) “Whenever you find  
highly paid CEOs, you will find highly paid directors. It’s no accident,” a finding  
confirmed by Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2002).  
 From an agency theory perspective, the presence of reciprocity imposes a 
cost: given its pervasive nature, boards are unlikely to ever be truly independent (Shivdasani 
& Yermack, 1999). However, if the role of the board is construed more broadly, reciprocity 
may help explain why Callahan, Millar and Schulman (2003) find a positive relationship 
between management participation in the director selection process and corporate 
performance, or why Klein (1998) finds a positive relation between the percentage of insider 
directors on some committees and financial returns. In a positive sense, reciprocity may 
underpin the social relations that permit boards to act as experts and advisors to the CEO. Of 
course, in a negative sense it may also be partly responsible for the self-protective 
justifications for poor performance (Porac, Wade & Pollock, 1999; Wade, Porac & Pollock, 
1997) and even the suppression of bad news and misreporting of data (Abrahamson & Park, 
1994; Bar-Gill & Bebchuk, 2002). Given its pervasive nature, it seems unlikely that 
reciprocity will ever not be factor in board-CEO relations. However, whether it serves a 
positive or negative function will depend critically on the circumstances.  
B. Social Influence 
 A second fundamental and pervasive psychological process that characterizes 
group dynamics is social influence. Almost as ubiquitous as reciprocity, deference to 
authority and to those seen as more expert also characterizes many groups and most 
organizations. Milgram (1974, p. 175), in his famous obedience studies, noted how 
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“relationship overwhelms content.”  Social influence occurs when the group signals, tacitly 
or explicitly, which attitudes and actions are appropriate and acceptable and which are not. 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) reported that over 99 percent of the directors they surveyed 
reported that the CEO had considerable informal power over the board. They also quoted one 
director as saying “…despite the appearance of openness and candor, the reality is quite 
different. A subtle set of unspoken norms, in fact, dictates the actual course of behavior in the 
boardroom.” This is not to say that norms cannot be overridden or changed, but they are 
powerful and pervasive in shaping the board’s behavior. 
 In groups, as on boards, individuals often look to others in a process of social 
comparison to determine what attitudes and actions are appropriate (Festinger, 1954). People 
pay particular attention to those who are similar, those of higher status, those with social 
capital, and those who appear to have expertise. Early studies showed, for example, that 
shared economic status was a basis for increased liking (Byrne, Clore & Worchel, 1966) and 
that attitudinal similarity increased the amount of money subjects were willing to lend others 
(Golightly, Huffman & Byrne, 1972). Drawing on these processes, O’Reilly, et al. (1988), 
illustrated how, after controlling for economic determinants of compensation, CEOs made 
more money the better paid were their compensation committee members in their own jobs. 
Their argument was that in the face of an ambiguous decision (how much to pay the CEO), 
the compensation committee chair used his own pay as a benchmark. Belliveau, et al. (1996) 
showed that CEOs with higher relative status than the chair of the compensation committee 
earned on average $138,000 more. Westphal and Zajac (1995) showed that existing board 
members favored new appointments that were demographically more similar and that 
similarity increased the CEO’s cash compensation. Young and Buchholtz (2002) also found 
that age dissimilarity between the CEO and the compensation committee chair was associated 
with weaker pay-for-performance. Based on research showing that demographic similarity 
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may increase social influence (Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989), Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1995) 
reported that the more similar board members were in age to the CEO, the higher the level of 
CEO compensation.  
 What are the implications of reciprocity and social influence for the functioning and 
effectiveness of boards of directors? First, given the pervasiveness of these processes, it 
seems highly unlikely that boards would not be affected. One possible outcome is that the 
board comes “to subconsciously (if not consciously) view the board through CEO eyes 
(Jensen & Murphy, 2004: 10).” Indeed, given the nature of their tasks, it may be argued that 
these processes are useful and necessary, albeit not without costs. In the following section we 
report a series of empirical tests contrasting the effects of economic and psychological 
determinants of executive compensation. Hypotheses derived from principal agent theory, 
governance, and managerial influence are examined through the lens of reciprocity and social 
influence.  
V. Empirical Results 
 Our data were obtained from an executive compensation firm and included all firms 
in their database for 2003 from two very different industries, retail and semiconductor 
manufacturing. The original data set consisted of 306 firms, 137 in the semiconductor 
segment and 129 in retail. Extensive data were provided on firm size (revenues, employees), 
performance (total shareholder return), the CEO (age, sex, tenure), the board (number of 
directors, insider-outsider status, number of meetings, number of committees), directors (sex, 
fees, status, age, tenure) and executive compensation (base, bonus, options granted, restricted 
stock grants, etc.).  
 Based on previous research, we use three measures of CEO compensation as 
dependent variables: base salary, total cash compensation (TCC) and total direct 
compensation (TDC). The latter comprises not only the base and bonus elements that enter 
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into TCC but also includes the Black-Scholes valuation of share option grants and restricted 
stock gains. We explicitly include restricted stock since, as Bebchuk and Fried (2004) have 
noted, boards are increasingly moving away from stock options and toward the use of 
restricted stock. However, restricted stock is an inefficient way of motivating CEOs to accept 
risky, value-increasing projects (Bryan, Hwang & Lilien, 2000). It has the incentive 
properties of a stock option with an exercise price of zero. As such, risk averse CEOs, or 
those with more social influence, should prefer restricted stock to options since they remain 
in the money even if the stock price falls (Main, et al., 1995). Means, standard deviations, 
and ranges for these variables are shown in Table 1. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
 Previous research has shown that CEO compensation is related to a variety of 
industry, firm, and CEO characteristics (e.g., Baker, Jensen & Murphy, 1988; Deckop, 1988; 
Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Harris & Helfat, 1997; Lambert, et al., 1993; Leonard, 1990; 
Schaefer, 1998). Therefore, in order to examine the impact of reciprocity and social influence 
on the CEO wage setting process, we first entered controls for industry, firm size, 
performance, and CEO characteristics into the base model. Size was measured as revenues 
and number of employees (both in logs) and performance as the average shareholder return 
over the previous three years.  The basic human capital control variables of tenure, age and 
sex are also entered at this stage. We then entered four variables commonly used to test 
principal agent predictions, the presence of large shareholders as measured by the number of 
block holders of at least 5%, whether the CEO served as chairman, the total size of the board 
in terms of the number of directors, and the number of independent directors on the board 
(e.g., Baglia, Moyer & Rao, 1996; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). 
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These are followed by four indicators of “governance quality”, the number of female 
directors, the presence of a staggered board, the annual number of board meetings, and the 
number of committees of the board (e.g., Core, et al., 1999; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997).  
 Only after controlling for these effects did we examine the effects of reciprocity and 
social influence on CEO compensation. Reciprocity was assessed by the presence of the CEO 
on the nominating committee, the fees paid to the head of the compensation committee, and 
the extent to which the CEO was on the board before the chair of the compensation 
committee (e.g., Callahan, et al., 2003; Linn & Park, 2005;  Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; 
Wade, et al., 1990). The social influence of the CEO over board members was assessed by 
whether the CEO also served as chairman, the total committees of the board on which the 
CEO served, whether the CEO was on the compensation committee (an increasingly rare 
event), and the extent to which the CEO was older than the chair of the compensation 
committee (e.g., Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand & Dalton, 1998; Klein, 
1998; Newman & Mozes, 1999; O’Reilly, et al., 1988).    
A. Economic Determinants of CEO Compensation 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the tests of the agency theory and good 
governance models of executive compensation: Model 1 reports the effects of control 
variables; Model 2 includes the principal agent tests; and Model 3 includes the good 
governance tests. Each model includes the results for CEO base salary, TCC and TDC. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
The results for Model 1 are consistent with much earlier research and show modest 
relationships between CEO compensation and industry and firm controls. For this sample, 
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executives in the retail industry earn more cash compensation. Larger firms in terms of 
revenues offer more cash compensation (base and TCC) and more total compensation (TDC) 
including share options and restricted stock. Prior firm performance, assessed as total 
shareholder return over the previous three years, shows a modest negative relationship with 
base salary and no significant relationship with the more performance related components of 
pay. The human capital controls in Model 1 also show modest and predictable associations 
with CEO compensation. While age is associated with higher levels of the cash based 
components of pay, tenure in the CEO role is revealed to have a modestly negative 
connection to pay. Sex of the CEO is unrelated to any compensation outcomes. 
Overall, these findings are unsurprising and consistent with much earlier research, 
showing that organization size and industry have stronger effects on CEO compensation than 
firm performance (Baker & Hall, 2004; Schaefer, 1998). For this sample, we find that in 
terms of total current compensation, size accounts for approximately 29% of variance while 
performance, assessed as the average return to shareholders over the previous three years, 
accounts for 1%. Starting with a universe of 137 articles on CEO pay, Tosi, et al. (2000) 
summarize the relative importance of the size factor as explaining 40% of the variance, while 
firm performance accounted for only 5% of the variance. While this meta-analysis suggests a 
stronger relationship than we find, the relative standing in importance of size versus 
performance is consistent with our result. 
Model 2 adds four variables often used as tests of principal-agent theory: the 
importance of blocks of stockholders—a positive measure of incentive alignment; whether 
the CEO also holds the position of chairman—a negative measure of alignment and 
monitoring; the total size of the board-- a positive indicator of monitoring; and the number of 
independent directors on the board—a positive measure of monitoring.  
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Consistent with much prior research, the results offer, at best, modest support for 
agency theory predictions. The presence of large shareholders does not result in lower levels 
of executive compensation nor in higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. This result may 
owe to the increasing preponderance of large block holdings, as the holding of stock has 
become increasingly institutionalized.  In our sample there is an average of five such block 
holders per company and only two of the companies are completely free from such influence. 
Also at odds with agency theory predictions, there are no associations between the number of 
independent directors on the board and lower levels of CEO compensation, offering no 
support for the increased monitoring that might be provided by having more independent 
directors. The significant associations between the CEO-Chairman role and increased base 
salary compensation is ambiguous in that this could reflect less board independence and 
skimming by the CEO (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), or reflect the additional 
compensation deserved by the added responsibility of serving in the dual role.  
Finally, Model 3 in Table 2 includes a set of variables that reflect the practical 
implications of principal agent theory that are seen as characteristics of governance quality. 
These include having more female directors (a positive factor that reflects increased board 
diversity), a staggered board (a negative factor that is presumed to increase the ability of 
management to entrench themselves), and increased board meetings and committees (both of 
which are presumed to increase the ability of the board to monitor the CEO). 
As suggested in earlier studies of governance (Core, et al., 1999; Dalton, et al., 1998), 
results of the tests in Model 3 are largely inconsistent with principal agent theory and do not 
appear to support the predicted effects of good governance. First, there is the surprising 
positive effect for female directors. These results show that having comparatively more 
females on the board of directors is positively associated with increases in base salary. This 
positive effect occurs after controls for industry, size, firm performance and other board 
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characteristics. Second, there is a positive association between the number of board 
committees and increased level of total cash compensation (TCC). This is contrary to the 
logic of principal agent theory that would suggest that more monitoring should result in 
greater incentive alignment. While these results are inconsistent with agency theory, they are 
consistent with CEO influence as shown in Table 3.  
B. Psychological Determinants of CEO Compensation 
An alternative way to think about governance and executive compensation is to 
consider how CEOs might, consciously or unconsciously, exert influence over their boards; 
that is, to consider the social psychological mechanisms that might lead a board to be more or 
less independent and thereby affect the board’s ability to monitor the CEO and align 
shareholder interests. We proposed that two pervasive psychological processes might operate 
in ways that could render a board less independent: norms for reciprocity between the board 
and the CEO, and CEO social influence. In the first instance, reciprocity between board 
members and the CEO was hypothesized to be more likely to occur under three conditions: 
the CEO serves on the nominating committee and can be seen as offering board members the 
gift of a seat; board members, including those on the compensation committee, receive 
comparatively higher remuneration for their service and feel obligated to return the favor of 
generous compensation; and the CEO has longer tenure on the board than the chair of the 
compensation committee such that the chair may feel some reciprocal obligation to the CEO 
for his or her role.   
In addition to reciprocity, a CEO’s social influence may also be increased insofar as 
s/he is able to shape the board’s agenda and control information available to board members 
and is seen as central to the functioning of the board. Under these circumstances, board 
members may be comparatively more likely to acquiesce to a CEO’s influence attempts. Four 
measures of CEO influence were proposed: CEO-Chair duality whereby the CEO largely sets 
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the agenda and manages board meetings; the total number of committees on which the CEO 
serves which enables him or her to monitor committee business and influence decisions; the 
CEO’s presence on the compensation committee; and the extent to which the CEO is older 
and more experienced than the compensation committee chair and is more likely to be seen 
as effective. Table 3 reports these results. Model 1 reports the results of tests of the effects of 
reciprocity on CEO compensation. Model 2 reports the tests of social influence and Model 3 
reports the aggregate findings. In each model, all of the descriptive variables introduced in 
Table 2 are entered as controls, but not reported here. 
The continuing inclusion of the control variables from Table 2, covering company 
descriptors, CEO human capital attributes and governance aspects, is an important step in 
eliminating any simultaneity or quality bias from the estimates.  It is necessary to 
recognize the possibility that in a corporation with an unusually high quality CEO there 
might also be an unusually high proportion of female directors, or an unusually large 
number of board meetings and so on.  Were such things to be true then the coefficients 
estimated on these latter variables may, to some extent, merely be representing otherwise 
omitted quality measures of the CEO rather than their own independent impact on the pay 
process.  While it is felt that the wide range of ‘control’ variables presented in Table 2 
goes a long way towards confronting such issues, it is necessary to alert the reader to the 
possibility of such a bias arising through any endogeneity of those variables included to 
describe reciprocity and social influence.   
----------------------------------- 




Results in Model 1 offer some support for the hypothesis that reciprocity may affect 
CEO compensation. After controlling for all variables in the previous models, the amount 
that the compensation committee chair receives in director’s fees is strongly related to CEO 
base, TCC and TDC. Compared to the adjusted R2 levels in Model 3 of Table 2, adding the 
measures of reciprocity increases the R2 by an average of seven percent.  This is a significant 
amount both statistically and practically. 
Model 2 shows the results for the test of CEO social influence on compensation. 
First, as reported previously, when the CEO also fills the Chairman’s role, s/he receives more 
base salary. As before, this may reflect either social influence or compensation for additional 
duties. Although there is little evidence that social influence has much direct impact on 
compensation, there is a significant effect on base pay for the age difference between the 
CEO and the compensation committee chair, with larger differences reducing the level of 
pay. 
Model 3 reports the aggregate results for CEO influence and corroborates the 
independence of the effects of reciprocity (fees paid) on all three measures of compensation 
and social influence, with the number of board committees the CEO serves on being 
positively related to base pay and CEO age difference being negatively linked to base pay. 
Additionally, in Model 3 there is a significant negative effect of the number of committees 
the CEO serves on the level of base pay.  
Given that these effects occur after controlling for numerous alternative economic 
and governance factors and explain significant increments in the adjusted R2, we see this as 
strong evidence for the operation of non-economic factors on the pay setting process for 
CEOs. Specifically, drawing upon well-developed theories of influence from social 
psychology, we find evidence consistent with the likelihood that, consciously or 
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unconsciously, CEOs and boards may be biased in ways that affect the amount and type of 
pay the CEO receives. 
To further illustrate these effects, we hypothesized that social influence processes 
may be more or less likely to occur under certain circumstances. We proposed that if social 
influence is occurring, the more opportunities the CEO had to exercise it, the more evident it 
should be. Three such instances seem likely. First, the more meetings of the board that are 
held, the more opportunities CEOs have to exert their influence. Second, the more 
committees the board has, the more opportunities for CEOs to influence decisions. Finally, 
contrary to agency theory but consistent with the operation of social influence, the larger the 
number of independent directors there are, the more opportunities for the CEO to use 
influence. Therefore, we hypothesized that there would be an interaction between social 
influence and CEO compensation such that the larger the number of committees, the more 
meetings of the board and the larger the number of independent directors, the more enhanced 
would be any effect of social influence on the likelihood of the CEO receiving positive 
treatment in his or her compensation. Table 4 reports the results of these tests.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
To test these interaction effects, we first entered all the variables used in Table 2 as 
controls, including industry, firm size and performance, CEO human capital measures, and 
measures of the test of principal agent theory (e.g., block shareholding, percentage of 
independent directors on the board) and good governance (e.g., board diversity, staggered 
meetings). We then entered the main effects from Table 3 for reciprocity and social influence 
(e.g., fees paid to director, total committees on which the CEO serves, and CEO duality) 
including the number of board meetings, committees, and the number of independent 
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directors. Given that we are seeking to examine the extent to which opportunity (as measured 
by the number of board meetings, the number of committees of the board, and the number of 
independent directors) can be seen to moderate the extent of the CEO’s boardroom influence, 
there are many interactions we could examine.  We focus here on three influence variables 
(CEO duality, number of committees of the board, and fees paid to the head of the 
compensation committee) and the three mediators (number of board meetings, total number 
of committees on which the CEO serves, and number of independent directors). Using the 
results presented in Table 4, Figures 1 through 3 show the graphical results of some of these 
interactions on compensation. 
The first Model illustrates the multiplicative effects of reciprocity on CEO TCC.  The 
main effects were discussed earlier: the more fees paid to the head of the compensation 
committee, the higher is the CEO’s base pay, while the number of meetings of the board has 
a generally insignificant influence on the CEO’s compensation. Beyond these main effects, 
however, there is a significant negative interaction between these two variables. The form of 
this interaction is shown in Figure 1 for the case of TCC and shows that when the head of the 
compensation committee receives higher fees and there are fewer committee meetings, the 
CEO receives significantly more total cash compensation. The slopes of all three lines in 
Figure 1 are significantly different form zero (Aiken & West, 1991: 16). The influence 
effects of higher fees are enhanced in the presence of fewer board meetings.  For an increase 
in fees paid to the Compensation Committee Chair of one standard deviation ($148,000) the 
impact on TCC is an increase of $97,000 when there are 11 board meetings per year but 
$324,000 when there are four meetings per year. The impact of board meetings on any 
restraining effect on pay is moderated in the presence of generous fees to directors. This 
suggests that reciprocity occurs when directors are well paid and do not have to work hard.  
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1-3 about here. 
------------------------------------- 
 
Model 2 shows significant positive interactions between the number of board 
committees the board has (a measure of the opportunities the CEO has to exert general 
influence) and the number of the board committees on which the CEO participates (a 
measure of social influence). As shown in Figure 2, the form of this interaction suggests that 
the combination of more CEO social influence and the more situations in which this can be 
exercised, the higher the cash compensation received. Increasing board participation when 
there are few board committees can actually reduce pay, but when there are more board 
committees the interaction with CEO service on committees can produce higher levels of 
pay.  In terms of the impact on base pay, going from zero committee participation to 
participating on two committees leads to an increase of $104,000 in the presence of six board 
committees, rather than a reduction of $154,000 in TCC when there are only three board 
committees in operation. Model 3 suggests that the impact of the CEO also serving as the 
Chairman of the board is more effective in the presence of larger numbers of independent 
directors.  In the absence of duality a larger number of independent directors seems to be 
more effective in holding down base pay.  But with duality in the CEO and Chairman role, 
the disciplining effect of outside directors all but disappears (Figure 3). 
The results for TDC for Model 3 in Table 4, suggest a more conventional effect of 
increased numbers of independent directors. In this case duality has a greater impact on TDC 
in the presence of a smaller number of independent directors (TDC in Figure 3).  So 
combining the roles of CEO and Chair has little impact on total CEO pay outcomes on boards 
that have large numbers of independent directors (seven in Figure 3).  But when the number 
of independent directors is smaller (three in Figure 3) this duality can outweigh the effect of 
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independent directors on CEO pay. These findings clarify earlier research that found mixed 
results for the effects of independent directors on CEO compensation (e.g., Baglia, et al., 
1996; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Moreover, the interaction shows that the effect of 
independent directors is contingent on CEO influence. 
VI. Discussion and Implications 
There is an extensive body of empirical research across multiple academic disciplines 
using principal agent theory to explain corporate governance and executive compensation. 
The results here confirm a number of these findings, help clarify and extend some of the 
contradictory results from earlier research, and suggest further directions for research and 
theory on CEO compensation.  Consistent with previous research, we show principal agent 
theory to be a useful lens through which to view governance and incentive alignment. 
However, we also illustrate how a more fine-grained approach to understanding the 
psychological dynamics that characterize how the board of directors and compensation 
committee operate can help to better understand the executive compensation setting process. 
In this regard, norms of reciprocity and social influence can help explain how and why 
boards may not design optimal compensation contracts. What is important about this is not 
that it runs counter to predictions of agency theory, but that these processes are fundamental 
to group dynamics everywhere, including boards of directors. 
First, and consistent with much previous research, we find that CEO 
compensation is more strongly related to organization size, measured as revenues, than 
firm performance (Baker & Hall, 2004; Baker, Jensen & Murphy, 1988; Gabaix & 
Landier, 2008; Schaefer, 1998). Also consistent with agency theory predictions of 
governance, we find that when the CEO also serves as chairman of the board, CEO base 
pay is increased. We find no effect for the proportion of independent directors on the 
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board or for the board size itself – although there is support from other studies suggesting 
that larger boards may be less effective at monitoring (Cheng, 2008; Coles, Daniel & 
Naveen, 2004; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996). 
Contrary to some recommendations for “good governance”, we find that having 
more committees of the board and more female directors results in higher CEO 
compensation. As shown in Figure 2, a likely reason for the anomalous finding for 
committees can be seen in its interaction with social influence; having more committees 
can enable an active CEO to influence decisions. The results for female directors are 
surprising. Rather than increased diversity resulting in better monitoring, our results 
suggest that CEOs receive more base pay when the board has more females. Three 
explanations seem possible. First, it may be that women directors are simply more 
generous. Second, it may be that female directors are less expert such that CEOs are able 
to convince them to award more compensation. However, subsequent analyses of 
interactions between the number of women directors and social influence revealed no 
significant effects, suggesting that this explanation is unlikely. Third, it may be that the 
boards of highly paid CEOs appoint more women, perhaps as a way of signaling that they 
are progressive—a form of window-dressing (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Farrell & Hersch, 
2005; Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 2007). Since our data are cross-sectional, we are 
unable to definitively answer this question.  
The findings here also replicate and extend prior research showing that CEO 
influence over the board can increase compensation beyond what economic determinants 
might justify. We find strong evidence consistent with the effects of reciprocity and 
social influence. When the chairman of the compensation committee receives 
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comparatively higher fees, CEO cash compensation is significantly higher. The 
magnitude of this relationship indicates that, when evaluated at the mean, every $1,000 
the board member receives is associated with an increase of $1,258 in CEO TCC. We 
show in Table 4 that the influence effect of higher fees to the compensation committee 
chair is more marked when accompanied by a lower number of board meetings (Figure 1) 
and that the more opportunities the CEO has to exert influence, as indexed by more board 
committees and meetings, the higher the CEO compensation (Figure 2). Interestingly, this 
influence effect also operates to counteract the impact of independent directors such that 
when the CEO has more influence (such as also being Chair, as in Figure 3) having more 
independent directors is not associated with lower pay. When CEO influence is low, the 
effect of having more independent directors is to lower CEO cash compensation, 
consistent with agency theory predictions.  
While these findings confirm and extend previous studies on the effects of CEO 
influence, they also help to clarify some contradictory findings in earlier research. For 
example, large sample meta-analytic studies of the relationship between board 
characteristics, CEO compensation, and firm performance indicate no meaningful 
relationships exist (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson & 
Ellstrand, 1999; Deutsch, 2005; Tosi, et al., 2000), reflecting the fact that findings from 
previous studies have been mixed. However, agency theory makes a strong prediction 
that the more independent the board, the more effective it should be in mechanism design 
and monitoring. Although some studies confirm this prediction (Boyd, 1994; Gompers, et 
al., 2003; Core et al., 1999; Pearce & Zahra, 1998), others either find no effects for board 
independence (Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Daily et al., 1998) or sometimes find positive 
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effects from less independent directors (Callahan, et al., 2003; Klein, 1998). Our findings 
suggest that these results may depend on the nature of relationship between the CEO and 
the board; reciprocity and social influence may have positive effects on board functioning 
and help the board provide expert advice and counsel to the CEO and improve 
organizational performance (Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1991; Westphal, 1999).  
Implications 
Much recent research and public policy has argued the need for boards of 
directors to increase their control over top managers, usually in the form of increased 
monitoring and better incentive alignment. However, from a psychological viewpoint, if 
not an economic one, there may be diminishing returns to these efforts (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1994). In an interesting study, Westphal (1998) has shown that when 
institutional pressures make boards structurally more independent, CEOs are likely to 
expend more effort at ingratiation and persuasion. Note that this does not necessarily 
imply that CEOs are behaving opportunistically but only that the board represents a 
critical institution with which they must operate if they are to be effective in 
accomplishing their organizational objectives. Similarly, it may also be that rather than 
the CEO influencing the board, it may be that the board, in the face of reciprocity and 
liking, may be trying to please the CEO.  
Several compensation scholars have recently noted that while managerial 
influence may impose some costs on shareholders, even larger costs may occur if strong 
incentives distort managers’ incentives and hurt corporate performance (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003; Jensen & Murphy, 2004). For example, studies have shown that too much 
ownership may entrench managers rather than align them with shareholder interests 
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(Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Mishra, McConaughy & Gobeli, 2000). Other studies 
have shown how, in the face of strong incentives, there may be pressures to misrepresent 
corporate performance or suppress bad news (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Bar-Gill & 
Bebchuk, 2002; Porac, et al., 1999). It may be that the principal agent view of incentive 
alignment and monitoring is too narrow. While optimal contracting may reduce agency 
costs, it may also hinder the ability of the board to offer expert advice to the CEO. 
Nevertheless, influence costs themselves can be substantial. 
To illustrate this point, we used the full regression model in Table 3 and the mean 
values for the standard economic variables in the model (see Table 1) to illustrate the 
potential impact of variations in the social influence variables on expected compensation 
outcomes. Consider a company where the CEO serves on the Nominating Committee, 
where the fees paid to the compensation committee chair are $50,000 above the average, 
and where the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board and sits on two as opposed to one 
board subcommittee. Under these conditions, the expected level of base pay will increase 
by 23% (from $547,000 to $697,000), the expected level of TCC will increase by 60% 
(from $1,100,000 to $1,848,000) and TDC will increase by 53% (from $5,975,000 to 
$8,435,000).  
We draw two general conclusions from these estimated results. First, although the 
addition of social influence variables increases the explained variability in CEO pay by a 
relatively modest (albeit statistically significant) amount, there remains a potential for 
these variables to have a large impact on realized reward. This is seen as evidence that 
the standard model is not capturing important additional influences on CEO pay. Clearly, 
managerial influence matters in the CEO wage setting process. Further, previous research 
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has shown that over- and under-payment at the CEO level have cascading effects and 
filter down to lower levels of managers (Wade, O’Reilly & Pollock, 2006). In this sense, 
CEOs who are overpaid may understate the total cost to the firm. 
However, a second and opposite conclusion can also be drawn in that the extra 
CEO compensation of roughly $150,000 in base pay, $748,000 in TCC, or $2,460,000 in 
TDC illustrated in the above stylized example may be trivial insofar as the average firm 
in the sample has approximately $5 billion in annual revenue. Furthermore, whatever the 
"cost" of this over-payment is, it needs to be balanced by the benefits of having a 
cooperative CEO-Board relationship. For firms where the board can provide valuable 
strategic expertise to the CEO, it may be argued that the value of this relationship may 
easily exceed the cost. 
Consistent with our findings, Fehr and Gaechter (2000) have argued for the 
importance of incorporating reciprocity into our models of executive compensation.  
Without reciprocity, it is difficult for incomplete contracts of the type required between 
CEOs and boards to flourish. Cooperative relationships are important for labor contracts 
to operate. This applies importantly to boards where reciprocity between the board and 
the CEO are critical. Interestingly, while reciprocity is becoming recognized as an 
important fact of economic life, principal agent theory has yet to incorporate these 
effects.  
Much of the current pressure for more independent boards misses the fact that 
while independent directors may be important, they are not immune to the psychological 
pressures we describe here. The interaction effects shown in Figure 1 offer strong 
evidence for the psychological micro-underpinnings of board operation. When CEOs 
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have more influence, having more board committees or independent directors can result 
in higher, not lower, levels of cash compensation. Simply calling for more independent 
directors or more monitoring by the board is unlikely to produce the effects predicted by 
agency theory unless the social psychology of the board is acknowledged. Jensen and 
Murphy (2004: 9) acknowledge the importance of understanding these psychological 
pressures and explicitly recommend the need to “change the structural, social and 
psychological environment of the board so that the directors (even those who fulfill the 
requirements of independence) no longer see themselves as effectively employees of the 
CEO.” Simplistic prescriptions are likely to produce unintended effects (e.g., Westphal, 
1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1994).  
Overall, we believe that agency theory is undoubtedly correct in noting the 
potential problems that the separation of ownership and control can create in firm 
governance and in underscoring the importance of the board’s role in incentive alignment 
and monitoring. However, we also believe that the common normative prescriptions of 
optimal contracting are too narrow and does not adequately reflect the psychological 
underpinnings that characterize actual board dynamics. Boards need to be concerned not 
only about opportunism on the part of the CEO but also designed in ways that promote 
the effective use of the directors’ expertise. To use the board’s expertise, reduce 
informational asymmetries between principals and agents, and increase goal alignment, 
the board-CEO relationship requires a level of trust and reciprocity that is unlikely to be 
achievable without social ties. This means that social influence processes are inevitable 
and need to be incorporated into theories and research on board design. The alternative, 
which is to structurally keep the CEO and the board independent of each other and to 
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charge the board with careful monitoring of the CEO, while feasible, is also likely to 
reduce trust and create incentives to further increase informational asymmetry, not 
favorable characteristics for incomplete contracts.  
If the goal of the board is to both monitor and assist the CEO, the inevitable 
psychological dynamics need to be incorporated into board design, acknowledging the 
agency costs that this may incur for CEO pay, but compensating through the added value 
of applying the board’s expertise to strategic issues confronting the firm. For example, at 
a minimum, this might include ensuring that the CEO is not the chair, thereby reducing 
influence, but also selecting directors who have the time and expertise required based on 
the challenges facing the firm (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009;  
Stevenson & Radin, 2009; Tosi, Shen & Gentry, 2003; Westphal, 1999). Similarly, the 
issue of incentive alignment posited by agency theory with regard to the board also needs 
to be applied to board members themselves.
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TCC Interaction Effects between Fees paid to the head of 
compensation committee and Board Meetings 
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Base Pay and Interaction Effects between 
Number of Board Committees and CEO 
Committee Participation 



































Base Pay and Interaction Effects between 





Mean Deviation (min) (max)
Controls
Industry (1=Retail, 0=Semiconductor) 0.65 0.48 0 1
Revenues (log$) 20.69 1.80 14.45 26.28
Employees (log) 8.30 1.78 4.03 14.22
3 Year Average TSR(%) 9.26 32.01 -68.81 163.55
Human Capital
CEO Tenure (years) 10.19 8.15 0.50 41.40
Age (years) 53.94 7.57 31.00 79.00
Sex (1=male, 0=female) 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00
Principal Agent
# Block Holders of over 5% 5.43 2.62 0 13
CEO Chairman (1=yes, 0=no) 0.59 0.49 0 1
# Directors 8.13 2.09 4 14
# Independent Directors 5.27 1.95 1 13
Governance
# Female Directors 0.89 1.05 0 5
Staggered Board (1=yes, 0=no) 0.52 0.50 0 1
# Meetings 7.27 3.36 2 29
# Committees 3.49 0.91 2 7
Reciprocity
CEO on Nom Cmte (1=yes, 0=no) 0.04 0.21 0 1
Director's Fees ($) 165,277 148,165 0 926,814
Tenure difference between CEO 1.42 8.96 -28.70 39.00
and Chair of the Compensation Committee (years)
Social Influence
CEO Chairman 0.59 0.49 0 1
Total Committees 0.27 0.49 0 2
CEO on Compensation Committee (1=yes, 0=no) 0.02 0.14 0 1
Age difference between the CEO -6.29 10.79 -37 31
and chairman of the Compensation Committee (years)
Dependent Variables
Base Salary ($) 645,280 320,251 81,840 2,000,000
Total Cash Compensation ($) 1,245,241 1,119,411 81,840 7,055,125
Total Direct Compensation ($) 4,603,257 8,582,853 81,840 101,000,000









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Base TCC TDC Base TCC TDC Base TCC TDC
Controls
Industry 0.142*** -0.022 -0.223*** 0.144*** -0.001 -0.178** 0.095 -0.048 -0.210***
Revenues 0.386*** 0.284* 0.450*** 0.328** 0.23 0.404*** 0.343** 0.228* 0.399***
Employees 0.274* 0.347** -0.115 0.257* 0.343* -0.106 0.208 0.293* -0.126
TSR 3 Years -0.122*** 0.052 0.116 -0.107** 0.061 0.117 -0.109*** 0.072 0.108
Human Capital
CEO Tenure -0.101* -0.077 -0.118* -0.111 -0.093 -0.136 -0.104 -0.073 -0.123
Age 0.161*** 0.101** 0.04 0.143*** 0.091** 0.039 0.144*** 0.079* 0.047
Sex 0.008 0.028 -0.04 -0.002 0.019 -0.047 0.018 0.044 -0.009
Principal Agent
# Block Holders of over 5% -0.009 -0.067 -0.132 -0.014 -0.054 -0.124
CEO Chairman 0.097** 0.077 0.048 0.084* 0.063 0.025
# Directors 0.056 0.026 -0.038 0.04 -0.005 -0.056
# Independent Directors 0.039 0.028 0.045 -0.004 -0.019 0.007
Governance
# Female 0.131* 0.124 0.172
Staggered 0.093** 0.013 -0.025
# Meetings -0.056 -0.018 -0.01
# Committees 0.043 0.179** -0.049
F-Ratio 41.88 19.59 7.51 29.36 14.46 5.88 28.44 12.84 5.16
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.40 0.09 0.57 0.40 0.09 0.59 0.43 0.10
df 7, 240 7, 240 7, 240 11,236 11,236 11,236 15,231 15,231 15,231







Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Base TCC TDC Base TCC TDC Base TCC TDC
Reciprocity
CEO on Nom Cmte 0.054 0.098 0.002 0.097* 0.102 -0.064
CCC Director's Fees 0.159*** 0.157** 0.389*** 0.170*** 0.167*** 0.398***
CEO and CCC ten diffs 0.003 0.051 0.088 0.074 0.088 0.049
Social Influence
CEO Chairman 0.091* 0.069 0.021 0.092* 0.069 0.063
# Committees CEO serves on -0.053 0.047 0.086 -0.111* -0.015 0.144
CEO on Comp Cmte 0.036 -0.005 -0.048 0.056* 0.017 -0.056
CEO Age Diff -0.108** -0.056 0.065 -0.136** -0.088 0.024
F-Ratio 26.515*** 12.006*** 5.252*** 24.024*** 11.238*** 4.659*** 23.245*** 10.857*** 4.915***
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.45 0.21 0.60 0.43 0.09 0.62 0.45 0.21
df 17,230 17,230 17,230 18,229 18,229 18,229 21, 226 21, 226 21, 226
R-square change 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.11
F-Ratio 4.17***  2.53* 4.03***  2.66** 0.55 0.73 3.26*** 1.38 2.05**
df 3,230 3,230 3,230 4,229 4,229 4,229 7,226 7,226 7,226
Entries are standardized regression coefficients; Huber-White robust standard errors used.











CCC Director's Fees 0.222** 0.405*** 0.765***
# of Board Meetings -0.048 0.106* 0.151***
Interaction -0.069 -0.315*** -0.487**
F-Ratio(22,225) 22.17*** 10.83*** 5.24***
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.47 0.24
F-Ratio( 3,225) 4.55*** 3.71** 5.82***
Model 2
# Committees of the Board 0.029 0.129* -0.059
# Committees CEO serves on -0.314*** -0.169 0.227
Interaction 0.280*** 0.214 -0.115
F-Ratio(22,225) 22.38*** 10.73*** 4.59***
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.46 0.21
F-Ratio( 3,225) 4.00*** 2.06* 0.80
Model 3
CEO Chairman -0.095 -0.089 0.281
# Independent Directors -0.124 -0.115 0.033
Interaction 0.224* 0.189 -0.261*
F-Ratio(22,225) 22.03*** 10.58*** 4.67***
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.45 0.21
F-Ratio( 3,225) 2.27* 0.47 1.02
Entries are standardized regression coefficients; Huber-White robust standard errors used.
Also included in the regressions as control variables, but not reported here, are the variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.
***p<.01
**p<.05
*p<.10  
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